Every so often an issue arises where the gocvernment has to decide
whether they are leading the country or whether they are happy to
float to the timetable and wishes of the public sector. With Treasury comfortable with a neo=liberal agenda, English has been quite
compfortable following hte lead and analysis of his department - sure
there wre decisions to be made, and expectations to manage, but by and
large there were few idealogical differences, it was more about
prioritiesand emphases, and making decisions within an agreed
framework.
Now he faces a bigger test, in an area he has less experience. Defence
has not always had good Ministers under National - but then their
attitude has been to send them off on missions which is seen by many
as supporting the military - although the wiser among the military
know that sometimes the right answer is not to use them -Labour
developed a good relationship through supporting real needs rather
than PR opportunities, and providing clear governance decisions
Now National face two major reasons for abandoning the pretence that
there is nothing to investigate. The first is that leaving the
response to Defence PR has backfired - leaving it to a current leader
to explain events for which he was not responsible has resulted in a
PR disaster, with Defence making a similar (trivial) mistake as
Stephenson / Hager, but burying itself thereby in all the detail that
they have attempted to avoid. The Guy Body illustration at the head
of the article is pertinent - click on the link:
http://www.kiwipolitico.com/2017/04/analysis-lieutenant-general-tim-keatings-operation-burnham-account-highlights-key-legal-concerns/
for the latest article highlighting that a case has been made which
has not been answered. It may well be able to be anwered, but meantime
the denial of an investigation is keeping the issue running.
More concerning to National (as distinct from tin-ear English) is the
growing concern that the NZDF has been playing the politicians rather
than the government leading. This has been one of the issues coming
from Wayne Mapp (who may well be pissed off at not having been given information earlier when he was Minister of Defence), but who sees the
need for an investigation to clear names - both his own and as
appropriate the defence forces or at least part of them.
That concern is also shown by another article by a National stalwart,
Audrey Young. She is no useful fool like "Chemical Mike" Hosking or
Cam Slater - she will defend the defensible but if warnings are not
heeded will not shy of pointing to the inevitable.
I have given the whole article below because one link to the story did
not work - The Herald is inclined to remove staries that it does not
want to attract too much attention - or at least change the url do
they are harder to find . . .
http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=11829518
"The Government will be missing a golden opportunity when, as is
likely next week, it rules out an inquiry into the 2010 New Zealand
Defence Force raid on two villages in Afghanistan.
It will be putting short-term political interests ahead of more
important longer term interests, including its own.
An inquiry would serve varying interests, but the villagers affected
by the raids would not necessarily be top of the list.
An inquiry would almost certainly come down somewhere between
potential "war crimes" as suggested by Nicky Hager and Jon Stephenson
in their book, Hit and Run, and that of "exemplary" behaviour by New
Zealand forces as characterised by the Chief of Defence Force, Lt
General Tim Keating.
At the very least it would find some regrettable errors.
Even a discreet inquiry that examined only New Zealand participants in
the raid on a confidential basis would have some benefit. To expect
SAS whistle-blowers to step forward now to seniors is risible.
It is certainly in NZDF's own interests to have an inquiry.
Future NZDF operations rest on the confidence in which the New Zealand
public has in them.
That confidence is not unconditional and it has not been enhanced by
either the accusations by the authors or Keating's handling of them.
An inquiry which Defence welcomed and fully co-operated with could not
lessen that confidence and could enhance it, if its mistakes are
owned.
It would also test the NZDF's own reporting systems.
The interview by David Fisher of an SAS soldier who was briefed about
the raid lends weight to the likelihood that NZDF's own reporting
procedures are not robust enough.
There is a suggestion by the authors that perhaps Keating himself had
not been fully informed by his own SAS as to what had happened, which
is a perfectly plausible explanation for such divergent views of the
same raid.
However the benefit of the doubt that they previously gave to the SAS
and Keating has diminished in direct correlation to the likelihood of
an inquiry.
I was in Iraq with Keating and Defence Minister Gerry Brownlee at Camp
Taji when the book was launched - although details of it were scant.
Keating is clearly an able leader with integrity. He was genuinely
offended at the suggestion of any war crime having been committed by
New Zealand troops - and he meant that in the strictest sense, not the
common understanding of it as acts of barbarism and depravity.
But Iraq is a vastly different proposition than Afghanistan. The Iraq
training mission has been a highly successful mission.
More than 20,000 Iraq security forces have been trained at Taji, with
no successful attacks on the camp from Isis, and no green on blue
attacks by trainees which plagued similar trainers in Afghanistan (99
attacks between 2008 and now).
Troops of the 23-country Coalition are keeping their distance
literally in secure compounds with very little contact with life
outside.
It minimises perceptions of them being occupying forces and allows
them to concentrate on mentoring Iraqis to reclaim their country for themselves.
It goes without saying that when the New Zealand deployment is due to
end in November next year the Kiwis on the ground in Iraq, the Defence
Force, and the Iraqi Government would like further yet-to-be-defined
support from Coalition members.
"The military have long resisted the concept that they are servants of the government of the day."
But even if National were returned to Government, an extension would
not be assured.
NZDF may need reminding that the current deployment does not have
majority support of the Parliament.
It is not required, but it is certainly desirable. The Government
supported the deployment against the majority wishes not only because
it was one of those times New Zealand had to be counted, but the
public supported it.
Public confidence in overseas deployments is not the only
consideration but it is a vital one.
And how people and organisations behave in adversity has a more
lasting impact than 100 feel-good press statements, at which Defence
excel, which is why its response to Hit and Miss is not just about the
past but future deployments.
The public deserves to know what happened rather than be bystanders in
the current public relations war over the book.
The Government and Defence believe that Hager and Stephenson's error
over the co-ordinates of the village location has completely
undermined their claims.
It has not. Keating, after blasting the authors for getting the
location wrong, got the right location of the raid but the name of the
village wrong. Despite his insistence that two villages 2km away from
the raid were Naik and Khak Khuday Dad, they were actually Beidak and
Khakandy. Both the authors and Keating were wrong about something.
But they are clearly talking about the same raid on the same place on
the same night by the same people. What they disagree on is the extent
of death and destruction that took place.
The Government and Defence believe that holding an inquiry would
undermine the ability of the SAS to carry out future raids, fearful
that every operation could be subject to an inquiry. (Well, shouldn't
it if it goes wrong?)
They think it would lower the threshold for commissioning inquiries.
But actually what NZDF probably fears most is civilian scrutiny and
the possibility that it could become normalised.
And in that respect, the Government has ignored its own interests in
denying an inquiry.
The relationship between the military and Government is one of the
most difficult ones, and the strains have been evident in previous
governments as well.
The military have long resisted the concept that they are servants of
the government of the day.
They have a sense of independence and autonomy which translates into a
culture of introversion, an aversion of scrutiny and lack of
accountability. They think they discipline themselves well enough,
thank you very much.
It was epitomised in former Defence Force chief Lt General Rhys Jones
who invited the United States to exercise in New Zealand - after a
long absence because of the anti-nuclear rift - without consulting the Government.
NZDF and the SAS in particular should be subject to more robust
civilian and parliamentary scrutiny - perhaps even by the statutory intelligence and security committee.
An inquiry into the raids would be a good start for a new era of
scrutiny.
- NZ Herald
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