• Inconsistent foundations: why Huntington was wrong about Belarus?

    From Steve Hayes@1:229/2 to All on Thursday, May 24, 2018 03:13:48
    XPost: soc.history, soc.culture.russian, alt.religion.christian.east-orthodox XPost: alt.politics.religion
    From: hayesstw@telkomsa.net

    Inconsistent foundations: why Huntington was wrong about Belarus?

    In his famous book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of
    World Order Samuel P. Huntington [1] attributed Belarus to the
    Orthodox Civilization. According to him, the imaginary dividing line
    between the Western and the Orthodox civilizations runs through the
    territory of Belarus. In fact, it lies close to the eastern border of
    interwar Poland, which included the western areas of today’s Belarus.
    Our expert Dr. Kiryl Kascian discusses why constitutional identity of
    Belarus contradicts to its attribution to the Orthodox Civilization by Huntington.

    The idea of this text primarily is inspired by the contemporary
    politics in a wider region of Eastern Europe. The ideological
    foundations of these developments are linked to significantly diverse interpretations of history and their institutionalization. Hence, they
    echo Huntington’s framework of civilizations’ clash.
    “Russian world” as a form of Civilizations’ Clash

    Huntington suggested that “Russia is creating a block with an Orthodox heartland under its leadership and a surrounding buffer of relatively
    weak Islamic states which it will in varying degrees dominate and from
    which it will attempt to exclude the influence of other powers” (p.
    164). He also underlines two other core elements of this framework.
    First, it’s the centrality of post-Soviet Orthodox countries for “the development of a coherent Russian bloc in Eurasian and world affairs”. Second, it is pivotal for Russia not only to maintain this system, but
    to have it accepted and approved by the world.
    In one of my previous texts with ICELDS, I emphasized that the Russian legislation lacks any clear definition of the concept of the “Russian World”. It represents a hybridization of cultural views with some
    political agendas, and its sources are primarily public addresses and
    other texts of Russian politicians, clergy and intellectuals. It also
    seems that appeals to this unwritten doctrine is equally important for
    at least some Russia’s neighboring countries. For example, Ukrainian authorities view the “Russian World” as a security threat and a justification for Russia’s interference in the domestic affairs of
    Ukraine [2].

    Considering the notion “Orthodox” in the terms proposed by Huntington,
    it seems relevant to focus on the statements by the two leading
    Russian public figures, namely Vladimir Putin and Vladimir Gundiaev
    (known as Patriarch Kirill). Putin’s “Crimean Speech” of March 2014 suggested that the baptism of Prince Vladimir in Khersones
    “predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and
    human values that unite the peoples of Russia, Ukraine and
    Belarus”[3]. Concurrently, Gundiaev actively promotes the Russian
    world as a system of common values which the entire Eastern Slavic
    civilization created through the populace’s baptism by Prince Vladimir
    in the Dnieper river in Kyiv [4]. Therefore, their messages suggest
    the central role of the Orthodox Christianity for the Russian
    historical canon and for the ideological foundations of the relations
    with the neighboring Eastern Slavic countries. In any case, it is
    Russia and its culture that assume the role of a “civilizational
    magnet” within this framework. Meanwhile, Huntington’s view on Russia
    and its geopolitical ambitions in its immediate neighborhood is
    significantly consistent with the Weltanschauung of the leadership of
    the Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church.

    Constitutional self-perception of history in Belarus

    As for Belarus, Huntington (p. 164) interpreted some developments of
    the early 1990s in Belarus in a way that allows him to conclude that
    as of 1995 Belarus was “part of Russia in all but name” with “little sense of national identity” and with significant fractions of the
    population who “seem to identify as much with Russia as with their own country.” These observations were first published as a book back in
    1996, following just five years of the reinstated independence of
    Belarus. Nevertheless, since then Belarus sustained as an independent
    state, although it remained an active member of the Russian-led
    economic and security alliances in the post-Soviet space.
    The official interpretation of the Belarusian statehood’s history can
    be found in the a concise phrase in the Preamble of the country’s Constitution. According to this document, contemporary Belarus relies
    on “the centuries-old history of development of Belarusian statehood.” Interestingly, this formula of the statehood was elaborated during the
    period described by Huntington, as the country adopted its
    Constitution on 15 March 1994. The Preamble with this formula remained unchanged even when in 1996 a new substantially-revised version of the Constitution was adopted.

    Although the Constitution does not contain references to specific
    historical state formations on the territory of modern Belarus, its
    draft mentioned that the Belarusian statehood rooted in the Grand
    Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) and the Belarusian Democratic Republic (BNR)
    [5]. Declared in 1918, the BNR can be regarded as the Belarusian
    statehood in modernity and the first one which used the name
    “Belarus”. At the same time, the role of the GDL, which existed until
    1795 and since 1569 was in the state union with the Kingdom of Poland,
    is important as it was the first formation which united the Belarusian
    lands within a single state.

    As for the GDL, both Soviet and modern Russian historical narratives
    are dominated by the view that suggests that the Eastern Slavic
    territories were allegedly conquered by Lithuanians and later
    subordinated to the Polish authorities. However, the Belarusian view
    on the GDL as a form of the Belarusian historical statehood (though
    indirectly) can observed earlier in the constitutional acts of the
    BNR. Therefore, this approach cannot be regarded as an invention of
    the Belarusian nationalism in the late Soviet Union [6].
    Still, the current Belarusian historical narrative states that the
    earlier statehood tradition encompasses the Duchies of Polack and
    Turau, which later were incorporated into the GDL. This process
    generally complies with the formulation of the Belarusian
    constitutional Preamble and its view upon the historical development
    of the Belarusian statehood as a sequence of the following formations:
    the Duchy of Polack (and Turau) – the GDL (and its Commonwealth with
    the Kingdom of Poland) – BNR – Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic – Republic of Belarus.

    Belarus: inconsistency of civilizational foundations

    There are two aspects which should be emphasized with regard of
    historical interpretation of this sequence. First, it does not cover
    the period from 1795 to 1917 when the lands of today’s Belarus were a
    part of the Russian Empire. In other words, the period when Belarus
    was in the Russian Empire is perceived as foreign domination. This interpretation of the period of Russian Empire in the Belarusian lands
    can be found even in some constitutional acts of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (the 1919 Manifesto and the 1937 Constitution) [7]. Moreover, during this period the Orthodox Christianity regained its
    dominant role in Belarus following the dissolution in 1839 of the
    Brest Church Union of 1596 between the Orthodoxy and Catholicism in Rzeczpospolita and the subsequent absorption of the Uniate Church by
    the state-sposored Russian Orthodox Church [8].
    Second, references to the Duchy of Polack (and Turau) require a closer
    look at the words of Gundiaev and Putin about the personality of
    Prince Vladimir taken in the Belarusian context. In fact, the
    documented political history in the Belarusian lands begins with the
    episode when he raped Rahnieda, a minor daughter of the Polack Prince
    Rahvalod, in the eyes of her family. Then Rahnieda’s father and
    brothers were killed, and the city of Polack was captured [9]. Thus,
    while Russian (and also Ukrainian) narratives portray Prince Vladimir
    as a prominent statesman, Belarusian interpretations of his
    personality would per se include this episode in Polack with all its
    negative connotations.

    Hence, the case of Belarus demonstrates that despite close
    contemporary political alliances with Russia, this country has
    significantly different historical foundations. They are often
    contradictory with Russo-centric historical canons, as promoted by the
    Kremlin and the Russian Orthodox Church. Still, these canons are not
    explicitly institutionalized in the legal acts of Belarus, although
    the current concise formulations combined with the references to
    historical constitutional acts provide the ground for a wider
    interpretation of the official historical canon of Belarus as
    inconsistent with the civilizational foundations of the “Russian
    World” and subsequently with the “Orthodox Civilization”, as described
    by Samuel P. Huntington.

    References:

    [1] Huntington, Samuel P. (1996). The Clash of Civilizations and the
    Remaking of World Order. New York: Simon & Schuster.
    [2] Position on Article 7 of the Law on Education submitted by the
    Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, CDL-REF(2017)051, http://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-REF(2017)051-e.
    [3] Address by President of the Russian Federation, 18/03/2014, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603.
    [4] Slovo Sviateyshego Patriarkha Kirilla na V Vsemirnom kongresse sootechestvennikov, prozhivayushchikh za rubezhom, 05/11/2015, http://www.patriarchia.ru/db/text/4265245.html.
    [5] Navumcyk, Siarhiej. VKL i BNR pryhadvalisia u prajekcie pieršaj Kanstytucyi suverennaj Bielarusi. RFE/RL Belarusian Service,
    15/03/2018, https://www.svaboda.org/a/29101047.html.
    [6] Kascian, Kiryl (2011). ‘Nation and Statehood in the Constitutional
    Acts of the Belarusian People’s Republic’, pp. 109-15, in: Doucette, Siobhan, et al. (eds.). Returning to Europe: Belarus Past and Future.
    Warsaw: Lazarski University.
    [7] Kascian, Kiryl (2011). ‘BSSR: ad heahraficna-administracyjnaj
    farmacyi da bielaruskaj nacyjanalnaj adzinki’, pp. 174-182 , in:
    Bialoruskie Zeszyty Historyczne No. 36.
    [8] See for instance: Plokhy, Serhii (2017). Lost Kingdom: The Quest
    for Empire and the Making of the Russian Nation, from 1470 to the
    Present. New York: Basic Books.
    [9] See: Wilson, Andrew (2011). Belarus: the Last European
    Dictatorship. New Haven: Yale University Press.

    Source:
    https://t.co/7kjxQPoXrv

    --
    Steve Hayes
    http://www.khanya.org.za/stevesig.htm
    http://khanya.wordpress.com

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: www.darkrealms.ca (1:229/2)