• In the Ruins of the House of Zupta

    From Steve Hayes@1:229/2 to All on Friday, February 16, 2018 12:31:14
    XPost: soc.culture.south-africa, za.politics, za.misc
    XPost: soc.history, soc.culture.indian
    From: hayesstw@telkomsa.net

    This article is the best summary of the history of government in South
    Africa for the last nine years I have yet seen.

    If you are outside South Africa, this may be all you need to know.

    If you are South African, you need to know at least this.


    In the Ruins of the House of Zupta

    Susan Booysen 15 Feb 2018 07:39 (South Africa)

    The largely unspoken trump card in the turn against Zuma was the
    inconvenient but incontrovertible truth that Zuma’s ongoing presence
    in leading government would in all probability lose the 2019 elections
    for the ANC.

    The House of Zupta is in ruins. Two of its last vestiges tumbled this
    week. As Jacob Zuma was forced into resignation from the Presidency of
    South Africa, the Brothers Gupta and a host of associates were
    arrested, charged and brought before court.

    The events brought to an end an unprecedented and embarrassing era in
    South African politics. Even as questions remain about exactly how
    pristine the new holders of political power in South Africa are, it is
    a certainty: the House of Zupta has fallen.

    Nothing about the cracking and crumbling of the Zupta edifice was
    easy, fast or guaranteed.

    It was to have been the heart of a kingdom that would prosper off the
    riches of the South African state. The Zuptas inhabited this house
    with abandon. Jacob Z constructed an elaborate safety net to cover the network’s operations of siphoning state funds into private coffers,
    linked directly and indirectly to the joint Gupta-Zuma political
    dynasty. Zuma ensured that core investigative and prosecutorial
    institutions were infiltrated – their task was to forestall and stall complaints, investigations and charges. To back this up, endless
    streams of public funds provided access to expert legal
    representation.

    Zuma’s construction of his bastion of hijacked state funds started
    early, taking shape in his first term in office (2009-2014),
    flourished and then spun out of control from as early as 2012. By the
    time of the ANC’s 2012 Mangaung conference the Guptas knew the result
    of the ANC elections well in advance of any formalisation. The Guptas
    aided Zuma in every aspect of the project, including in guiding the
    appointment of puppet Cabinet ministers who would service the grand
    Zupta project of pilfering and banal enrichment in exchange for
    sidekicks’ small-fry benefits such as trips to Dubai.

    The Zupta alliance, extending deep into the South African state, had
    become brazen. All their actions signalled that they knew they had the
    power. It was a parallel system of government.

    They controlled the king of the castle, who, in the arguments of
    Ronnie Kasrils, was an expert seeking out potential benefactors to
    help him realise the life that he thought he was entitled to. In the
    Guptas, Zuma had found the perfect match. Of course, the Zuma clan’s
    pursuit of riches was not limited to tapping into the Gupta networks exclusively. There were (or are) other families too, besides multiple underworld links that have surfaced.

    This kingdom of political and financial extravagance was supposed to
    have lasted forever; Zuma’s ANC – a faction that was cultivated into political dominance – was supposed to have endured until “Jesus comes again”.

    The cracks widened, most tangibly in December 2015 when Zuma plunged
    into the replacement of Finance Minister Nhlanhla Nene with Des van
    Rooyen, all on the Guptas’ instigation if not prescription. The
    landscape started changing and a story unfolded of growing public
    scrutiny, investigative journalists’ relentless pursuit of leads and
    then, the #GuptaLeaks. The tide was changing, even if for the time
    being the activities of pilferage and looting with the Zuptas as
    beneficiaries continued.

    Further turning points that helped destroy the House of Zupta included
    Thuli Madonsela’s State of Capture report and the Constitutional
    Court’s “breach of the Constitution” ruling on Zuma and his Nkandla bastion. Opposition parties’ and civic organisations’ use of the
    courts of South Africa to force accountability, which the factional
    Zumaist ANC could not muster, helped to consolidate the gains. Next,
    structures in the ANC started dissenting, foremost among them the
    veterans. Gradually, ANC members and branches also started rebelling
    across provinces beyond the Premier League and KwaZulu-Natal.

    A Cyril Ramaphosa team had started working on building an intra-ANC
    defeat-Zuma alliance soon after Ramaphosa’s serendipitous ascension
    into the ANC deputy presidency in 2012. Kgalema Motlanthe stood on the
    verge of defeat in the ANC presidential race and refused to enter as a compromise deputy presidential candidate on the Zuma slate. As
    contentious and complicit in many respects as this Ramaphosa move was
    (and will remain for the foreseeable future), he accepted the ANC and
    South African deputy presidencies. This was the beachhead to defeat
    the Zupta regime.

    The House of Zupta had become entrenched so firmly that defeat
    appeared close to impossible. Zuma had envisaged it as the empire on
    which the sun would never set. The Nkosazana Dlamini Zuma candidacy
    for the ANC’s Nasrec 2017 elections was supposed to be the warrantee
    of never-ending control. To win power, the Ramaphosa alliance would
    need the support of many of the Zumaists. Compromise with the
    compromised became one of the rules of the game to collapse pillars of Zuptaism.

    Foundations started collapsing under the “weight” of the slim 179-vote majority in the Nasrec presidential elections. This was the turning
    point that might so easily not have materialised. There was the
    over-confidence that made a substantive batch of North West and Free
    State branches and regions overstep the boundaries of legitimate
    conference preparations. Court rulings disqualified these delegates
    from Nasrec participation. A 3,000-strong NDZ caucus meeting as Nasrec
    took off made the NDZ disciples believe that they could sacrifice the
    contested branches; these were “a drop in the ocean”, they argued.
    Even more, victory was certain, they prophesised. The DD
    Mabuza-Mpumalanga “unity” ticket might have helped, to some unknown
    extent, but might not even have been definitive.

    Despite this milestone of Ramaphosa’s Nasrec victory, the House of
    Zupta was standing. The Zumaists reckoned they could still safeguard
    power until 2019. It would, they thought, give enough time to secure
    the family silver of nuclear deals, and milking the economy generally
    through the last of the acolytes in state-owned entities and
    sycophantic deployees in state departments.

    Yet, power shifted phenomenally in the six weeks from early January to mid-February 2018, reaching a crescendo in the 10 days from 4 to 14
    February.

    One after the other the ANC’s internal structures first shifted
    tentatively in favour of Ramaphosa. Next the shifts became definitive.
    Zumaist support in the National Executive Committee (NEC) grew
    markedly as he emerged as the successor-in-rapid-making. The Ramaphosa
    side gained a sufficient majority in the National Working Committee
    (NWC) to make it clear that there was no going back to the Zuma order.
    The ANC parliamentary caucus (generally taking its lead from the NEC)
    was confirmed as up to 80% pro-Ramaphosa. That meant that they would
    be able and prepared to carry out a motion of no confidence. The days
    of August 2017 with its narrow parliamentary defeat of an anti-Zuma
    motion were over.

    A final Zupta pillar was pulled down under the threat from opposition
    parties plus the ANC to bring on such a motion of no confidence in
    Parliament, or impeachment proceedings once those rules would be in
    place by mid-March (as per the Constitutional Court instruction of
    late 2017). Zuma was being smoked out of his lair. He had nowhere to
    go ... Neither had his Gupta associates.

    Under the new political umbrella of anti-corruption action, the
    National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) and Hawks found their previously immobilised feet. Action started. Ramaphosa had gained traction
    through his Davos World Economic Forum visit. He returned later in
    January with the message that the precondition for investment was
    decisive action on corruption. The Guptas, with their Vrede-Estina
    dairy as laundering veil for personal gain and glorious wedding
    parties, were trapped.

    The rug of power was pulled further from underneath Zuma’s feat when
    the half-new ANC postponed the State of the Nation address, so that
    Zuma would not be the messenger of ANC government plans in a
    pre-election year. The eclipse of Zuma’s state power was extended when
    he was deprived of power to conduct his own Cabinet meetings. He
    agreed to effective co-governance with Ramaphosa; his every move was
    watched.

    The largely unspoken trump card in the turn against Zuma was the
    inconvenient but incontrovertible truth (proven in multiple, credible
    public opinion polls) that Zuma’s ongoing presence in leading
    government would in all probability lose the 2019 elections for the
    ANC. Even Zuma acknowledged this indirectly in his yelps of
    victimhood. The circle closed when Zuma was forced into resignation on
    14 February, and Ramaphosa took the oath of presidential office a mere
    16 hours later.

    Among the ruins of the House of Zupta stands a lonely former
    president, crying: What are the reasons? What have I done? DM

    Susan Booysen

    https://t.co/bxU3nXzTcK


    --
    Steve Hayes
    http://www.khanya.org.za/stevesig.htm
    http://khanya.wordpress.com

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    * Origin: www.darkrealms.ca (1:229/2)