• Re: Why a U.S-China War over Taiwan Won't Be Anything Like the Syria St

    From ClutchCargo@1:229/2 to All on Monday, April 23, 2018 07:37:45
    From: allreadydun@gmail.com

    https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ST86JM1RPl0

    rule the world? oh sure

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: www.darkrealms.ca (1:229/2)
  • From slider@1:229/2 to All on Monday, April 23, 2018 21:02:06
    From: slider@anashram.com

    rule the world? oh sure

    ### - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SeAigj3LG-s

    "when dogs get wings..." ;)

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: www.darkrealms.ca (1:229/2)
  • From thang ornerythinchus@1:229/2 to All on Thursday, April 26, 2018 17:32:06
    From: thangolossus@gmail.com

    On Mon, 23 Apr 2018 07:08:37 +0100, slider <slider@anashram.com>
    wrote:

    Great powers have a habit of intervening to shield weak allies from rival >great powers and advance their own purposes. Last week it was Russia
    vowing to shoot down American missiles bound for Syrian chemical-weapon >sites. Judging from recent Chinese words and deeds, next week could see
    the U.S. Navy attempting to repulse a Chinese assault on nearby Taiwan.

    https://www.yahoo.com/news/why-u-china-war-over-001700726.html?guccounter=1

    The Chinese Communist Party depicts the island as a wayward province and
    has pledged to restore mainland sovereignty there—by force if necessary.
    As China amasses military power, improving its chances of imposing a
    solution at manageable cost, it may define necessary more expansively.
    Power begets ambition.

    The prospect of maritime war is nothing new to the Western Pacific.
    Sometimes the possibility of a U.S.-China war hovers in the background. >Sometimes it vaults into the foreground, as in recent days. On Wednesday >China’s navy held live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait at short notice, >ostensibly to “deter separatists” and “draw a red line to the U.S. and >Taiwan.” The exercise came on the heels of a South China Sea naval parade >ballyhooed as China’s biggest in 600 years.

    That is, the parade was the biggest since the age of Admiral Zheng He and
    the Ming Dynasty, when China (briefly) ruled the Asian seas. >President-for-Life Xi Jinping likes keeping company with grand figures
    from China’s past—and using them for branding and messaging in the here
    and now.

    The standard line is that Zheng He reestablished Chinese diplomacy
    vis-à-vis Southeast and South Asia, and thus scored a triumph of
    nonviolent naval strategy. And so he did. That’s the smiling visage
    Beijing likes to put on its regional diplomacy. But Ming benevolence >constitutes only part of the tale. Zheng He also crushed a hostile fleet
    near Malacca, sent troops into combat on the island of Ceylon, and staged >shows of force during his voyages.

    He prevailed without fighting when possible but fought when need be—at sea >or on land. By casting today’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) as >the heir to the Ming admiral’s “treasure fleet,” Xi Jinping puts the >region on notice that—now as six centuries ago—a mailed fist nestles >within the velvet glove of Chinese diplomacy.

    Suppose Taipei and Washington step over Beijing’s red line, setting armed >strife in motion. How would a Taiwan Strait clash unfold? Well, since Xi >evidently intended the live-fire exercise in part as a rejoinder to
    American actions against Russian client Syria, let’s compare a
    hypothetical cross-strait war to the Eastern Mediterranean imbroglio.
    Three glaring differences leap out. And all three portend ill for America
    and Taiwan.

    First of all, the strategic setting in East Asia is at once more and less >permissive for U.S. naval and air forces than in the Eastern
    Mediterranean. More permissive because the vast emptiness of the Pacific >Ocean to Taiwan’s east affords naval task forces ample maneuver space. >Denizens of Europe, the Levant, and North Africa who once styled the
    middle sea the “Great Sea” never got a load of the Pacific.

    Off Syria, threats to U.S. forces could emanate from any point of the >compass, not to mention the wild blue above and the depths beneath. By >contrast, Pacific waters resemble a featureless plain. Navies thrive on
    the open sea, where they can flit hither and yon. With cunning and some
    luck, they can elude foes’ efforts to detect, track, and target them. In >theory, then, the Western Pacific is a combat theater made for the U.S.
    Navy.

    But in practice the surroundings are far more forbidding than the >Mediterranean Sea. Any naval action will take place within reach of PLA
    Navy ships of war. Chinese commanders will array shore-based >firepower—mainly missiles and missile-toting warplanes—to back up the >fleet. A detachment of U.S. and allied forces squared off against a
    Russian detachment in Syria. The encounter was modest in scale. A
    detachment of U.S. forces will confront the combined might of China’s
    armed forces in the Pacific. An encounter there could sprawl across East >Asia.

    Only snake-oil salesmen would prophesy with confidence that a fraction of
    one armed force—even a stronger one—will vanquish the whole of a near-peer >force. It’s even more doubtful when the battle takes place on the latter’s >home ground. After all, the pugilist protecting its turf lies close to
    scenes of action, knows the physical and cultural terrain better than any >outsider can, and has the option of hurling the bulk of its forces into
    the fray to overpower antagonists fighting far from home.

    Second, the politics of a cross-strait war is likewise sobering. The great >powers that smote Syria—the United States, France, and Great Britain—saw >only a limited stake in the action. They only wanted to punish the Assad >regime for using chemical arms. They had no desire to overturn the regime. >Such a goal would have mandated that they invade Syria in full force,
    defeat the Syrian military and its Russian protectors, and install a
    viable replacement regime in Damascus. Judging from hard experience in >Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, that would be an expensive, open-ended grind >fraught with peril.

    But that wasn’t the case last week. Almost any measure can qualify as >punishment. Western leaders reserved themselves the liberty to order a
    volley of missiles, halt the action afterward, and declare victory. Even
    one round on target would let them claim to have meted out retribution.

    A cross-strait conflict wouldn’t be such a token affair. The great power >that would smite Taiwan—namely China—would set what strategists term an >“unlimited” aim. China, that is, would put an end to the Republic of >China’s (ROC) political existence. Imposing sovereignty on a
    self-governing society like Taiwan would involve destroying the ROC armed >forces, and then the democratic regime in Taipei. That’s a serious goal
    and would summon forth maximum resistance from the island’s defenders. In >turn Beijing would have to commit as many forces as necessary to the
    endeavor for as long as it took.

    China would have to be all in.

    And so would America if it hoped to defeat China. That being the case, the >United States must prize Taiwan’s independence at least as much as China >prizes extinguishing it. Think about the plight that would have beset
    Russia had NATO, rather than administer a few strikes, mounted a
    full-scale assault against the Assad regime last week. That would have
    pitted Russian forces against a united Western alliance, far from Russian >home bases. Preserving the Assad regime against such an onslaught would
    have demanded that Moscow expend massive financial and military resources.

    Whether it would—or could—have done so is doubtful.

    Such are the hazards of expeditionary ventures. That thought experiment >reveals something about the hardships awaiting the U.S. Navy and
    affiliated joint forces off Taiwan. Americans must ask themselves whether >they want it—it being the independence of a free people on Taiwan—enough >to take on China under the mainland’s shadow, and to invest lives, >treasure, and military hardware in the enterprise for long enough to beat >back a cross-strait offensive.

    Upholding the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would not come cheap or easy. If
    the leadership in Washington finds such an effort is worthwhile, it should >start educating the electorate about the issues at stake now—lest Joe >Six-Pack be caught-off guard by a Chinese attack, and withhold his support
    from the endeavor. Any effort will falter without fiery zeal from the
    American people.

    And third, Taipei must take ownership of its own destiny. Geography and >politics will be moot if it doesn’t. That’s because the war will be over >before U.S. forces can fight their way to the battleground in the face of
    PLA anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) defenses. There will be no
    U.S.-China war—just a China-on-Taiwan brawl in which the mainland is a >heavy favorite.

    I’ve likened anti-access to China’s offshore “crumple zone.” Rather than a
    rigid defensive shield, it’s a sacrificial component designed to collapse >in a controlled way, much as the engine compartment and trunk in your car
    are designed to collapse in a controlled way should you get in an
    accident. These mechanical buffers absorb the shock of a collision, >protecting what really matters—you, and any passengers sitting in the
    cabin with you.

    Taiwan and the waters and skies adjoining it are what will really matter
    to PLA commanders in a cross-strait conflagration. If Chinese warplanes, >missiles, surface craft, and submarines can engage U.S. naval forces at
    long range, they can help absorb the shock from the American
    offensive—and, if successful, slow it to a halt before it reaches the >combat zone. At a minimum A2/AD will grant PLA forces time to subdue the >island’s defenders.

    Taipei must give U.S. rescuers that time back, and it must help keep
    American losses down, and fighting strength up. Missile-armed ROC Navy
    patrol craft can work in concert with shore-based rocketeers to mount a >delaying action in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese air and sea forces can fan >out to the island’s east, helping open a corridor for U.S. reinforcements >to steam into the theater. They can keep China from winning quickly—and >give the U.S. Navy time to puncture China’s offshore crumple zone.

    Devising forces, doctrine, and tactics to stall a cross-strait blitz
    should be the constant aim for Taiwan’s defenders. They may yet prevail if >they take an active hand in protecting their island.

    So much for the differences between Taiwan and Syria. As it ponders
    strategy for the Far East, the U.S. military might take a page from the >Russian playbook in Syria. Moscow’s deterrent threats carried considerable >weight during the run-up to the Western strikes, in large measure because >U.S., British, and French commanders and officials feared harming Russian >soldiers or airmen as a byproduct of the action. They feared triggering a >larger war through the collateral damage that is part of all martial >undertakings.

    As Nassim Nicholas Taleb might put it, Moscow made it known it had skin in >the game in the Eastern Mediterranean. President Vladimir Putin and his >lieutenants talked big about the dire repercussions of an assault on the >Syrian regime, to be sure. But they also stationed Russians on the scene, >serving notice that Moscow cared enough about Assad’s survival to put >Russian lives in harm’s way. They were committed to the cause—and prepared >to share in its dangers and costs as well as its geopolitical benefits.

    Or think back to the Cold War. Washington kept a military garrison in West >Berlin throughout that twilight struggle. Few deluded themselves that
    Berlin could ride out an assault, encircled as it was by communist East >Germany. The U.S. Army’s Berlin Brigade was a tripwire force, deterring
    the foe by showing the United States had skin in the game in West Berlin.
    In other words, Washington used force deployments to convey that it
    regarded an assault on Berlin as an assault on NATO as a whole—and would >reply accordingly.

    The city would fall should Soviet or East German forces attack it. But at
    the same time communist bloc leaders knew they would embroil themselves in
    a much larger war. Thankfully, that was a war Moscow proved loath to fight.

    Geography, political resolve, and the military balance will line up on >Beijing’s side during a cross-strait war. Taipei must deploy artful >strategy to balk China’s advantages—and Washington must broadcast that it >has skin in the game.

    Tripwires, anyone?

    ### - yeah, don't forget 'china' on that hit list america huh...

    Formosa or Forlessa?? hey maybe mr-t could sell taiwan to 'em to cancel
    out the 'trillions' the US owes china? :)

    Slider go back to bed. It will never happen. This is the time of
    great peace and gentlemanly conduct because we all have nuclear
    weapons and no one intends to use them.

    It's a bit like bikie clubs (outlaw motorcycle clubs). The patched
    members are incredibly polite to each other, "you first", "no, after
    you", "no, I insist" - because they are all so capable of incredible
    violence that no one wants anything to start up, ever.

    That's 21st century geopolitics. Wakey wakey slider...


    Democracy is a pathetic belief in the collective wisdom
    of individual ignorance.

    H. L. Mencken

    ---
    This email has been checked for viruses by Avast antivirus software. https://www.avast.com/antivirus

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: www.darkrealms.ca (1:229/2)
  • From slider@1:229/2 to thangolossus@gmail.com on Friday, April 27, 2018 10:25:53
    From: slider@anashram.com

    On Thu, 26 Apr 2018 10:32:06 +0100, thang ornerythinchus <thangolossus@gmail.com> wrote:

    On Mon, 23 Apr 2018 07:08:37 +0100, slider <slider@anashram.com>
    wrote:

    Great powers have a habit of intervening to shield weak allies from
    rival
    great powers and advance their own purposes. Last week it was Russia
    vowing to shoot down American missiles bound for Syrian chemical-weapon
    sites. Judging from recent Chinese words and deeds, next week could see
    the U.S. Navy attempting to repulse a Chinese assault on nearby Taiwan.

    https://www.yahoo.com/news/why-u-china-war-over-001700726.html?guccounter=1 >>
    The Chinese Communist Party depicts the island as a wayward province and
    has pledged to restore mainland sovereignty there—by force if necessary. >> As China amasses military power, improving its chances of imposing a
    solution at manageable cost, it may define necessary more expansively.
    Power begets ambition.

    The prospect of maritime war is nothing new to the Western Pacific.
    Sometimes the possibility of a U.S.-China war hovers in the background.
    Sometimes it vaults into the foreground, as in recent days. On Wednesday
    China’s navy held live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait at short notice, >> ostensibly to “deter separatists” and “draw a red line to the U.S. and >> Taiwan.” The exercise came on the heels of a South China Sea naval
    parade
    ballyhooed as China’s biggest in 600 years.

    That is, the parade was the biggest since the age of Admiral Zheng He
    and
    the Ming Dynasty, when China (briefly) ruled the Asian seas.
    President-for-Life Xi Jinping likes keeping company with grand figures
    from China’s past—and using them for branding and messaging in the here >> and now.

    The standard line is that Zheng He reestablished Chinese diplomacy
    vis-à-vis Southeast and South Asia, and thus scored a triumph of
    nonviolent naval strategy. And so he did. That’s the smiling visage
    Beijing likes to put on its regional diplomacy. But Ming benevolence
    constitutes only part of the tale. Zheng He also crushed a hostile fleet
    near Malacca, sent troops into combat on the island of Ceylon, and
    staged
    shows of force during his voyages.

    He prevailed without fighting when possible but fought when need be—at
    sea
    or on land. By casting today’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLA Navy) >> as
    the heir to the Ming admiral’s “treasure fleet,” Xi Jinping puts the >> region on notice that—now as six centuries ago—a mailed fist nestles
    within the velvet glove of Chinese diplomacy.

    Suppose Taipei and Washington step over Beijing’s red line, setting
    armed
    strife in motion. How would a Taiwan Strait clash unfold? Well, since Xi
    evidently intended the live-fire exercise in part as a rejoinder to
    American actions against Russian client Syria, let’s compare a
    hypothetical cross-strait war to the Eastern Mediterranean imbroglio.
    Three glaring differences leap out. And all three portend ill for
    America
    and Taiwan.

    First of all, the strategic setting in East Asia is at once more and
    less
    permissive for U.S. naval and air forces than in the Eastern
    Mediterranean. More permissive because the vast emptiness of the Pacific
    Ocean to Taiwan’s east affords naval task forces ample maneuver space.
    Denizens of Europe, the Levant, and North Africa who once styled the
    middle sea the “Great Sea” never got a load of the Pacific.

    Off Syria, threats to U.S. forces could emanate from any point of the
    compass, not to mention the wild blue above and the depths beneath. By
    contrast, Pacific waters resemble a featureless plain. Navies thrive on
    the open sea, where they can flit hither and yon. With cunning and some
    luck, they can elude foes’ efforts to detect, track, and target them. In >> theory, then, the Western Pacific is a combat theater made for the U.S.
    Navy.

    But in practice the surroundings are far more forbidding than the
    Mediterranean Sea. Any naval action will take place within reach of PLA
    Navy ships of war. Chinese commanders will array shore-based
    firepower—mainly missiles and missile-toting warplanes—to back up the
    fleet. A detachment of U.S. and allied forces squared off against a
    Russian detachment in Syria. The encounter was modest in scale. A
    detachment of U.S. forces will confront the combined might of China’s
    armed forces in the Pacific. An encounter there could sprawl across East
    Asia.

    Only snake-oil salesmen would prophesy with confidence that a fraction
    of
    one armed force—even a stronger one—will vanquish the whole of a
    near-peer
    force. It’s even more doubtful when the battle takes place on the
    latter’s
    home ground. After all, the pugilist protecting its turf lies close to
    scenes of action, knows the physical and cultural terrain better than
    any
    outsider can, and has the option of hurling the bulk of its forces into
    the fray to overpower antagonists fighting far from home.

    Second, the politics of a cross-strait war is likewise sobering. The
    great
    powers that smote Syria—the United States, France, and Great Britain—saw >> only a limited stake in the action. They only wanted to punish the Assad
    regime for using chemical arms. They had no desire to overturn the
    regime.
    Such a goal would have mandated that they invade Syria in full force,
    defeat the Syrian military and its Russian protectors, and install a
    viable replacement regime in Damascus. Judging from hard experience in
    Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya, that would be an expensive, open-ended
    grind
    fraught with peril.

    But that wasn’t the case last week. Almost any measure can qualify as
    punishment. Western leaders reserved themselves the liberty to order a
    volley of missiles, halt the action afterward, and declare victory. Even
    one round on target would let them claim to have meted out retribution.

    A cross-strait conflict wouldn’t be such a token affair. The great power >> that would smite Taiwan—namely China—would set what strategists term an >> “unlimited” aim. China, that is, would put an end to the Republic of
    China’s (ROC) political existence. Imposing sovereignty on a
    self-governing society like Taiwan would involve destroying the ROC
    armed
    forces, and then the democratic regime in Taipei. That’s a serious goal
    and would summon forth maximum resistance from the island’s defenders.
    In
    turn Beijing would have to commit as many forces as necessary to the
    endeavor for as long as it took.

    China would have to be all in.

    And so would America if it hoped to defeat China. That being the case,
    the
    United States must prize Taiwan’s independence at least as much as China >> prizes extinguishing it. Think about the plight that would have beset
    Russia had NATO, rather than administer a few strikes, mounted a
    full-scale assault against the Assad regime last week. That would have
    pitted Russian forces against a united Western alliance, far from
    Russian
    home bases. Preserving the Assad regime against such an onslaught would
    have demanded that Moscow expend massive financial and military
    resources.

    Whether it would—or could—have done so is doubtful.

    Such are the hazards of expeditionary ventures. That thought experiment
    reveals something about the hardships awaiting the U.S. Navy and
    affiliated joint forces off Taiwan. Americans must ask themselves
    whether
    they want it—it being the independence of a free people on Taiwan—enough >> to take on China under the mainland’s shadow, and to invest lives,
    treasure, and military hardware in the enterprise for long enough to
    beat
    back a cross-strait offensive.

    Upholding the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would not come cheap or easy. If
    the leadership in Washington finds such an effort is worthwhile, it
    should
    start educating the electorate about the issues at stake now—lest Joe
    Six-Pack be caught-off guard by a Chinese attack, and withhold his
    support
    from the endeavor. Any effort will falter without fiery zeal from the
    American people.

    And third, Taipei must take ownership of its own destiny. Geography and
    politics will be moot if it doesn’t. That’s because the war will be over >> before U.S. forces can fight their way to the battleground in the face
    of
    PLA anti-access and area-denial (A2/AD) defenses. There will be no
    U.S.-China war—just a China-on-Taiwan brawl in which the mainland is a
    heavy favorite.

    I’ve likened anti-access to China’s offshore “crumple zone.” Rather >> than a
    rigid defensive shield, it’s a sacrificial component designed to
    collapse
    in a controlled way, much as the engine compartment and trunk in your
    car
    are designed to collapse in a controlled way should you get in an
    accident. These mechanical buffers absorb the shock of a collision,
    protecting what really matters—you, and any passengers sitting in the
    cabin with you.

    Taiwan and the waters and skies adjoining it are what will really matter
    to PLA commanders in a cross-strait conflagration. If Chinese warplanes,
    missiles, surface craft, and submarines can engage U.S. naval forces at
    long range, they can help absorb the shock from the American
    offensive—and, if successful, slow it to a halt before it reaches the
    combat zone. At a minimum A2/AD will grant PLA forces time to subdue the
    island’s defenders.

    Taipei must give U.S. rescuers that time back, and it must help keep
    American losses down, and fighting strength up. Missile-armed ROC Navy
    patrol craft can work in concert with shore-based rocketeers to mount a
    delaying action in the Taiwan Strait. Taiwanese air and sea forces can
    fan
    out to the island’s east, helping open a corridor for U.S.
    reinforcements
    to steam into the theater. They can keep China from winning quickly—and
    give the U.S. Navy time to puncture China’s offshore crumple zone.

    Devising forces, doctrine, and tactics to stall a cross-strait blitz
    should be the constant aim for Taiwan’s defenders. They may yet prevail
    if
    they take an active hand in protecting their island.

    So much for the differences between Taiwan and Syria. As it ponders
    strategy for the Far East, the U.S. military might take a page from the
    Russian playbook in Syria. Moscow’s deterrent threats carried
    considerable
    weight during the run-up to the Western strikes, in large measure
    because
    U.S., British, and French commanders and officials feared harming
    Russian
    soldiers or airmen as a byproduct of the action. They feared triggering
    a
    larger war through the collateral damage that is part of all martial
    undertakings.

    As Nassim Nicholas Taleb might put it, Moscow made it known it had skin
    in
    the game in the Eastern Mediterranean. President Vladimir Putin and his
    lieutenants talked big about the dire repercussions of an assault on the
    Syrian regime, to be sure. But they also stationed Russians on the
    scene,
    serving notice that Moscow cared enough about Assad’s survival to put
    Russian lives in harm’s way. They were committed to the cause—and
    prepared
    to share in its dangers and costs as well as its geopolitical benefits.

    Or think back to the Cold War. Washington kept a military garrison in
    West
    Berlin throughout that twilight struggle. Few deluded themselves that
    Berlin could ride out an assault, encircled as it was by communist East
    Germany. The U.S. Army’s Berlin Brigade was a tripwire force, deterring
    the foe by showing the United States had skin in the game in West
    Berlin.
    In other words, Washington used force deployments to convey that it
    regarded an assault on Berlin as an assault on NATO as a whole—and would >> reply accordingly.

    The city would fall should Soviet or East German forces attack it. But
    at
    the same time communist bloc leaders knew they would embroil themselves
    in
    a much larger war. Thankfully, that was a war Moscow proved loath to
    fight.

    Geography, political resolve, and the military balance will line up on
    Beijing’s side during a cross-strait war. Taipei must deploy artful
    strategy to balk China’s advantages—and Washington must broadcast that >> it
    has skin in the game.

    Tripwires, anyone?

    ### - yeah, don't forget 'china' on that hit list america huh...

    Formosa or Forlessa?? hey maybe mr-t could sell taiwan to 'em to cancel
    out the 'trillions' the US owes china? :)

    Slider go back to bed. It will never happen. This is the time of
    great peace and gentlemanly conduct because we all have nuclear
    weapons and no one intends to use them.

    It's a bit like bikie clubs (outlaw motorcycle clubs). The patched
    members are incredibly polite to each other, "you first", "no, after
    you", "no, I insist" - because they are all so capable of incredible
    violence that no one wants anything to start up, ever.

    That's 21st century geopolitics. Wakey wakey slider...

    ### - so everyone can just threaten and (in many cases recently) bomb each other and 'nothing' is ever gonna happen because everyone's a gentleman??

    e.g., russia is just gonna stand by while israel take out russian-supplied installations in syria, in spite of the fact that russia has said they'll
    stop israel from doing so and israel has responded by asserting that
    they'll blast anyone who shoots down their jets - the only possible
    solution being for russia to NOT supply said installations thereby leaving syria wide open to attack by, well, just anyone who wants to apparently...

    and NOTHING is gonna happen??

    riiiiight....

    Wakey Wakey thang... :)



    Democracy is a pathetic belief in the collective wisdom
    of individual ignorance.

    H. L. Mencken

    ### - democracy is the placebo of the people. ;)

    --- SoupGate-Win32 v1.05
    * Origin: www.darkrealms.ca (1:229/2)